Flashbots has designed and implemented a proof of concept for permissionless MEV extraction called MEV-Geth. It is a sealed-bid block space auction mechanism for communicating transaction order preference. Their proof of concept has incomplete trust guarantees, yet we believe it's a significant improvement over the status quo. The adoption of MEV-Geth should relieve a lot of the network and chain congestion caused by frontrunning and backrunning bots.
| Guarantee | PGA | Dark-txPool | MEV-Geth | | -------------------- | :-: | :---------: | :------: | | Permissionless | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | | Efficient | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | | Pre-trade privacy | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | | Failed trade privacy | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | | Complete privacy | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | | Finality | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
Permissionless A permissionless design implies there are no trusted intermediary which can censor transactions.
Efficient An efficient design implies MEV extraction is performed without causing unnecessary network or chain congestion.
Pre-trade privacy Pre-trade privacy implies transactions only become publicly known after they have been included in a block. Note, this type of privacy does not exclude privileged actors such as transaction aggregators / gateways / miners.
Failed trade privacy Failed trade privacy implies loosing bids are never included in a block, thus never exposed to the public. Failed trade privacy is tightly coupled to extraction efficiency.
Complete privacy Complete privacy implies there are no privileged actors such as transaction aggregators / gateways / miners who can observe incoming transactions.
Finality Finality implies it is infeasible for MEV extraction to be reversed once included in a block. This would protect against time-bandit chain re-org attacks.